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GETTING IT RIGHT: WHETHER TO
OVERTURN QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
DAVID D. COYLE*

ABSTRACT
Qualified immunity, the defense available to police officers and other
government officials facing civil rights lawsuits, has increasingly come
under attack. In recent opinions, Justice Clarence Thomas has noted his
growing concern that the Court’s current qualified immunity
jurisprudence, which deals with whether a right is “clearly established”,
strays from Congress’s intent in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the
statute giving rise to civil rights claims). Other jurists and legal scholars
similarly criticize the doctrine, with many calling for the Court to revisit
its qualified immunity jurisprudence and abolish or significantly alter
the doctrine.
Given that the Court’s qualified immunity precedents have been
routinely followed for decades, should the Court overturn them, even if
they are wrong? After all, as Justice Brandeis recognized, “[s]tare decisis
is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”1
Moreover, qualified immunity is derived from statutory precedent, and
the Court counsels that stare decisis concerns weigh heavily with such
judicial doctrines.
Assuming the Court erred in its current qualified immunity
jurisprudence, this Article considers whether stare decisis concerns
should be relaxed to allow qualified immunity to be overturned. This
Article first addresses why relaxing stare decisis for statutory precedents
is appropriate in the case of qualified immunity. The Article then builds
Copyright © 2022 David D. Coyle
*
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research assistance.
1. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938), overruled in part by
Helvering v. Mt. Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938); see, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
827 (1991) (arguing that stare decisis is the “preferred course”).
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on and applies a stare decisis framework advanced by Professor Randy
Kozel2 to the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence to determine
whether stare decisis requires the Court to preserve qualified immunity
in its current form. After applying this framework, the Article ultimately
concludes that the Court’s current “clearly established” law standard
should be overturned, but some form of qualified immunity should
remain.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article considers whether stare decisis requires the Court to
maintain its current test for qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is
a defense available to police officers and other government actors
facing civil rights lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Court’s
current formulation of the qualified immunity doctrine, “officers are
entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a
federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of
their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’”3 Thus, to win a civil
rights suit against a police officer or other government official, a
showing that an officer violated an individual’s constitutional rights is
not enough. In addition, a plaintiff must illustrate that the unlawfulness
of the officer’s conduct was “clearly established” by then existing law.
The killing of George Floyd and other recent high-profile police
incidents has ushered in a renewed national discussion on policing, and
more specifically, on qualified immunity and its prong requiring
“clearly established” law.4 The discussion surrounding the doctrine
proceeds on several different fronts. Some states and localities passed
legislation eliminating qualified immunity for police officers for state
or municipal causes of action.5 Nationally, debate has ensued over
whether a police reform act should eliminate or alter qualified
immunity.6 Scholars and jurists from across the ideological spectrum
3. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards,
566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)).
4. See Madeleine Carlisle, The Debate Over Qualified Immunity Is at the Heart of Police
Reform. Here’s What to Know, TIME (June 3, 2021), https://time.com/6061624/what-is-qualifiedimmunity/ (“As calls for greater police accountability gained momentum in 2020, the decades-old
doctrine that protects officers from some lawsuits came under fresh scrutiny”). See also George
Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. (2021) (eliminating qualified
immunity for law enforcement officers).
5. See An Act Concerning Police Accountability, H.R. 6004, 2020 Leg., July Spec. Sess.
(Conn. 2020) (limiting governmental immunity for civil actions, and eliminating it for civil actions
for equitable relief); S.R. 20-217, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020) (“Qualified
immunity is not a defense to liability.”); H.R. 4, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2021) (eliminating “the
defense of qualified immunity” in claims under the act, for people acting under the color of law
who deprive people of “rights, privileges, or immunities”); Press Release, N.Y. St. Sen., Senator
Zellnor Y. Myrie to Introduce Bill to End Police “Qualified Immunity” (June 26, 2020),
https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/zellnor-myrie/senator-zellnor-y-myrieintroduce-bill-end-police-qualified (discussing the introduction of a bill to end qualified immunity
in New York); NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGS., Qualified Immunity (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/qualified-immunity.aspx (discussing state
limitations of the qualified immunity defense).
6. See H.R. 1280; Marianne Levine & Nicholas Wu, Lawmakers Scrap Qualified Immunity
(Aug.
17,
2021
5:38
PM),
Deal
in
Police
Reform
Talks,
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/08/17/lawmakers-immunity-police-reform-talks-505671
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have called for qualified immunity to be abolished or at least revisited
by the Supreme Court.7 Much of the attention focuses on the current
requirement for “clearly established” law.8
Other factions are unified in their support of qualified immunity.
Police organizations, many politicians (especially conservative
lawmakers), legal scholars, and jurists highlight the benefits of the
doctrine.9 Supporters argue that it allows officers to make split-second
(outlining the debate amount lawmakers surrounding potential limitations on qualified
immunity); Jacqueline Alemany, Power Up: Republican Sen. Mike Braun to Unveil New Bill
Scaling Back Qualified Immunity for Police, WASH. POST (June 23, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/powerup/2020/06/23/poweruprepublican-sen-mike-braun-to-unveil-new-bill-scaling-back-qualified-immunity-forpolice/5ef1163c88e0fa32f8240186/ (discussing a Republican senator’s proposed bill to limit
qualified immunity, in the context of the national debate surround the issue).
7. See, e.g., Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421 (2021) (Thomas, J., statement respecting
the denial of certiorari) (discussing issues with the qualified immunity doctrine, including its lack
of grounding in text or history); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating his “concerns about our qualified immunity
process”); Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari) (reaffirming his previously expressed doubts concerning qualified immunity); Kisela v.
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1161 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the use of
qualified immunity “as an absolute shield” and misuse of the “clearly established” standard); see
generally Scott Michelman, The Branch Best Qualified to Abolish Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1999 (2018) (“[Q]ualified immunity is a mess of the Supreme Court’s making, and the
Supreme Court should clean it up.”); William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 45, 88 (2018) (“[T]he doctrine lacks legal justification, and the Court’s
justifications are unpersuasive.”); Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the
Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and
Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113
MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1254 (2015) (criticizing the Court’s current qualified immunity jurisprudence
as “risk[ing] turning federal judges from protectors of the Constitution into unreasoning deniers
of worthy claims of constitutional rights”).
8. See, e.g., Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1161 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (calling attention to the
high level of specificity the majority was requiring for the “clearly established” law standard);
Hoggard, 141 S. Ct. at 2421 (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (noting that
the Court’s “clearly established” law standard cannot be found in § 1983’s text and “may have
little basis in history”).
9. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982) (discussing how the doctrine
balances interests on both sides); Richard G. Schott, J.D., Qualified Immunity: How it Protects
Law Enforcement Officers, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN (Sept. 1, 2012),
https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/legal-digest/legal-digest-qualified-immunity-how-it-protects-lawenforcement-officers (explaining the need for qualified immunity such as the high risks of the job
and burden of lawsuits); POLICE FOUND., Qualified Immunity and Accountability in Policing,
https://www.policefoundation.org/qualified-immunity-and-accountability-in-policing/
(last
visited Oct. 4, 2021) (explaining the “substantial” impact of lawsuits, and accountability
alternatives outside ending qualified immunity); NAT’L POLICE SUPPORT FUND, Why We Need
Qualified Immunity (Feb. 18, 2021), https://nationalpolicesupportfund.com/why-we-needqualified-immunity/ (“[Q]ualified immunity is essential for allowing police to do their jobs
without fear of baseless legal actions that could ruin their reputations and their careers.”);
Graham Moomaw, At First Debate, McAuliffe Walks Back Support for Ending Qualified
MERCURY
(Sept.
16,
2021
9:51
PM),
Immunity
for
Police,
VIRGINIA
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and sometimes life-or-death decisions without unduly laboring over
whether their decision might expose them to liability.10 Qualified
immunity arguably helps retain and recruit officers, especially in an
environment where crime is up, and perceived respect for the
profession is down.11 Moreover, the doctrine protects local government
coffers from the expenses of litigation and payouts; parties incur lower
time-related litigation expenses through the early dismissal of frivolous
lawsuits.12
Other scholars and jurists focus less on the merits of qualified
immunity and instead call for the legal underpinnings of the doctrine
to be fundamentally reexamined by the Court. Notably, Justice
Clarence Thomas highlighted that the Court’s “qualified immunity
jurisprudence stands on shaky ground” and that the current test
“cannot be located in § 1983’s text and may have little basis in

https://www.virginiamercury.com/2021/09/16/at-first-debate-mcauliffe-walks-back-support-forending-qualified-immunity-for-police/ (former Gov. Terry McAuliffe of Virginia explains his
support for qualified immunity and why this protection for police should remain); Manu Raju &
Jessica Dean, Changes to Qualified Immunity in Policing Deal Face Senate GOP Resistance, CNN
(May 26, 2021 9:12 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/26/politics/policing-deal-qualifiedimmunity-senate-republicans/index.html (explaining Sen. John Cornyn and other republican
Senate members of the republican party expressed concern and hesitation in eliminating qualified
immunity).
10. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 399–400 (2015) (explaining how qualified
immunity benefits officers in high risk situations); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)
(discussing how decisions in the heat of the moment are viewed differently than with hindsight);
Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760, 766–67 (6th Cir. 2015) (discussing the difference in ability to
judge “at the scene” versus after the fact).
11. See, e.g., David Migoya, More than 200 Police Officers Have Resigned or Retired Since
Colorado’s Police Reform Bill Became Law, DENVER POST (Aug. 18, 2020 6:00 AM) (explaining
more than 200 police officers resigned or retired within weeks after a Colorado law prohibited
qualified immunity); Leigh Patterson & Scott Franz, Following a Tough Year, Some Colorado
Departments Lose Officers and Struggle to Hire, KUNC (Sept. 1, 2021 at 2:00 PM),
https://www.kunc.org/news/2021-09-01/following-a-tough-year-some-colorado-departmentslose-officers-and-struggle-to-hire (reporting on the high number of resignations at police
departments, and difficulties hiring replacements).
12. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (listing the social costs of in the absence of qualified immunity,
including the expense of litigation); compare Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A
Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1879–80 (2018)
(referencing a study conducted by Joanna Schwartz. In analyzing this study, approximately onethird – 29.9–31.6 percent– of government officials who raised qualified immunity were denied a
motion to dismiss during pleadings, and 32.2 percent at summary judgement), with Joanna C.
Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L. J. 2 (2018) (concluding only 3.9 percent of
cases in which qualified immunity could be raised were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.
For the 1,183 § 1983 cases surveyed – whether qualified immunity was raised or not – 0.6 percent
were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage, and 2.6 percent were dismissed at summary
judgement on qualified immunity grounds) (emphasis added); see also NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGS.,
supra note 5 (explaining qualified immunity protects state and local government from paying
money damages).

COYLE_4.4._FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

288

4/20/2022 8:42 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 17

history.”13 As Justice Thomas explains it, not only is qualified immunity
absent in the text of § 1983, but the Court’s current test requiring
“clearly established” law “is not grounded in the common-law
backdrop against which Congress enacted § 1983.”14 That common-law
backdrop includes “certain immunities [that] were so well established”
when Congress passed the Act prompting § 1983 liability, such that the
Court reads those immunities into the statute.15 Yet, in Justice Thomas’
view, because the Court’s current qualified immunity analysis is neither
grounded in the statute’s text nor its common-law backdrop, the Court
has “substituted [its] own policy preferences for the mandates of
Congress.”16 By making this statement, Justice Thomas is expressing
what he sees as “the Court adopt[ing] the [“clearly established law”]
test not because of ‘general principles of tort immunities and defenses’
[that existed at common law when Congress enacted § 1983] … but
because of a ‘balancing of competing values’ about litigation costs and
efficiency.”17
But if it is true that the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence is
misguided, even terribly so, should the Court abolish the doctrine?
After all, even if qualified immunity stands on shaky legal
underpinnings, it has consistently been a defense to claims under § 1983
for more than half a century—the Court first recognized qualified
immunity in 1967, in Pierson v. Ray.18 Although the Court has at times
modified the contours of the defense,19 it has consistently applied the

13. Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421, 2421 (2021) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the
denial of certiorari).
14. Id. at 2422 (quoting Turning Point USA at Ark. State Univ. v. Rhodes, 973 F.3d 868, 879
(2020)).
15. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1870 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
16. Hoggard, at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))
(alteration in original) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017)).
17. Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S.Ct. 1862, 1864 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari) (citations omitted).
18. 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (holding that a defense of good faith was available to officers
under the civil rights act).
19. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (changing the test for qualified immunity to the “clearly
established” law standard); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (clarifying that cases need
not be “fundamentally” or “materially” similar to satisfy the “clearly established” law standard);
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (clarifying that “clearly established” law should not
be defined “at a high level of generality”).
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doctrine despite calls to reconsider20 or abolish it.21 As the saying goes,
“in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right.”22 Moreover, qualified immunity
derives from statutory precedent, an area where stare decisis, the legal
doctrine requiring judges to uphold precedent, weighs heavily.23 Stare
decisis aims to “promot[e] ‘the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles,’ and contribut[e] to ‘the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process.”24 Without attention to
precedent, judges risk being seen as political actors bending the law to
fit their ideological aims, rather than neutral stewards of our legal
system.
The purpose of this Article is not to analyze whether the Court
erred in its qualified immunity precedents—that is a topic that has been
thoroughly explored by many legal scholars.25 Rather, this Article takes
as its starting point the assumption that the Court erred in grafting
qualified immunity onto § 1983. Assuming the Court erred in creating
the “clearly established” law standard, this Article questions whether
stare decisis precludes overturning the Court’s qualified immunity
jurisprudence.
Part I briefly explores the history of the Court’s qualified immunity
jurisprudence and highlights arguments that the Court’s rationale is

20. See, e.g., Hoggard, 141 S. Ct. at 2421 (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of
certiorari) (“[I]n an appropriate case, we should reconsider either our one-size-fits-all test or the
judicial doctrine of qualified immunity more generally.”); Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1872 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the Court “should reconsider our
qualified immunity jurisprudence”)
21. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 7 (“[Q]ualified immunity is a mess of the Supreme
Court’s making, and the Supreme Court should clean it up.”); Baude, supra note 7 at 88 (“[T]he
doctrine lacks legal justification, and the Court’s justifications are unpersuasive.”); Reinhardt,
supra note 7 at 1254 (criticizing the Court’s current qualified immunity jurisprudence as “risk[ing]
turning federal judges from protectors of the Constitution into unreasoning deniers of worthy
claims of constitutional rights.”).
22. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quoting Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis
J. dissenting)).
23. BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 333 (2016) (noting that
for statutory questions stare decisis “applies with special force.”).
24. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-266 (1986) (describing the Court’s penchant
for adhering to the principles of stare decisis).
25. See, e.g., Michelman supra note 7 at 1999 (“[Q]ualified immunity is a mess of the
Supreme Court’s making, and the Supreme Court should clean it up.”); Baude, supra note 7 at 88
(“[T]he doctrine lacks legal justification, and the Court’s justifications are unpersuasive.”);
Reinhardt , supra note 7 at 1254 (criticizing the Court’s current qualified immunity jurisprudence
as “risk[ing] turning federal judges from protectors of the Constitution into unreasoning deniers
of worthy claims of constitutional rights”).
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misguided. The Article then considers whether stare decisis should
prevent the Court from abolishing the doctrine. Part II proceeds in four
sections. Section A explains the rationale behind stare decisis and
highlights the factors the Court typically considers when doing a stare
decisis analysis. Section B introduces Prof. Randy Kozel’s framework
for stare decisis analysis which aims to enhance the values underlying
the doctrine, and then builds on that work. Section C first explains why
the usual heightened form for stare decisis for statutory cases should
be relaxed in the qualified immunity context, and then goes on to apply
the Kozel framework to the Court’s qualified immunity doctrine.
Ultimately, although there is a strong argument that the current test for
qualified immunity should be overturned, qualified immunity should
not be eliminated entirely. Instead, the Court should overrule its more
recent qualified immunity jurisprudence, and revert to the test for
qualified immunity established in Pierson v. Ray.
I. THE HISTORY OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND CALLS
TO ABOLISH IT
Although a full exploration of the history of the qualified immunity
doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to briefly
chart the course the doctrine has taken. This helps inform the stare
decisis analysis that comes later in this Article and ultimately sheds
light on how the doctrine might further evolve.
Qualified immunity is a defense to civil rights actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The relevant section of the statute states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken
in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable.26

The statute does not explicitly mention “qualified immunity”, nor

26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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does it discuss the current qualified immunity test that requires the
search for “clearly established” law. The Court, however, has read the
statute “in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and
defenses rather than in derogation of them.”27 The Court does so
because “certain immunities were so well established in 1871 … that
[the Court] presume[s] that Congress would have specifically so
provided had it wished to abolish them.”28 Thus, in Pierson v. Ray, the
Court held that officers could claim qualified immunity for a § 1983
false arrest claim if the officers acted in good faith and on probable
cause because “the defense of good faith and probable cause” was
available to officers at common law.29
A. The Current “Clearly Established” Law Standard
Under the Court’s current qualified immunity test, “officers are
entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a
federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of
their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’”30 Thus, a police
officer (or other government official) is given impunity so long as his
or her actions did not violate “clearly established” law. In other words,
unless factually similar cases exist where an officer’s (or other
government official’s) conduct was found to violate someone’s civil
rights, the officer is likely to be entitled to immunity.31 If similar cases
do not exist, or the officer’s conduct is not clearly violative of the
Constitution, then the law is not “clearly established” and the case
against the officer is dismissed.32
27. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1870 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (1986).
28. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
30. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards,
566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)).
31. See id. at 589, 590 (2018) (“To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a
sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent . . . . Thus, we have stressed the need to
‘identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . . was held to have violated
the Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per
curiam)); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42 (2011) (explaining that for the law to be clearly
established it is necessary that there be “controlling authority” or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of
persuasive authority’” (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999))).
32. See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (noting that while “there can be the rare ‘obvious case,’
where the unlawfulness of the officers’ conduct is sufficiently clear . . . . ‘a body of relevant case
law’ is usually necessary” (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam));
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, 742 (“We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate . . . . The general
proposition, for example, that an unreasonable search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment
is of little help in determining whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly
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Qualified immunity cases often turn on how factually identical the
relevant precedent must be. The current test requires a high level of
specificity to qualify as “clearly established” law.33 Several jurists and
scholars, find that the Court’s current practice of requiring “extreme
factual specificity” effectively makes qualified immunity “nearly
absolute.”34
It is important to note that the “clearly established” law standard is
objective.35 An officer’s subjective good faith is irrelevant, and instead,
courts determine “the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct,
as measured by reference to clearly established law.”36 Thus, courts look
to “clearly established” law to determine whether “every ‘reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing’ is unlawful.”37
B. The Road to The “Clearly Established” Law Standard
Originally, the test was not the objective “clearly established” law
standard in use today. Rather, the test included a subjective component
derived from the common law. In Pierson v. Ray, the Court held that
“the defense of good faith and probable cause” was available to the
officer alleged to have made an unconstitutional arrest because that
defense was “available to the officers in the common-law action for
false arrest and imprisonment.”38 Under the test announced, the
officers would be entitled to a qualified immunity if they acted in good
faith while making an arrest supported by probable cause for a
violation of a statute that they reasonably believed to be valid, but
which was later held unconstitutional.39 The subjective component of
the test considered whether the officer claiming qualified immunity
“took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury.”40 Thus, under the test first
established.”).
33. See, e.g., al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (“We have repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth
Circuit in particular . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”).
34. Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, fn 129 (S.D. Miss. 2020) (quoting John C.
Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 859 (2010)); see also
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1161 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s
current jurisprudence as effectively requiring “a factually identical case to satisfy the ‘clearly
established’ standard”)
35. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–819 (1982) (noting that the Court is “defining
the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms.”).
36. Id.
37. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
38. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
39. Id. at 555-557.
40. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
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announced in Pierson, an officer’s motivations for their actions
becomes important.
Fifteen years later, this subjective standard was overturned in favor
of the objective “clearly established” law standard in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald.41 In Harlow, the Court announced that “government
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”42
Although the test moved to an objective one in Harlow, initially
there was some indication that “clearly established” law could be
defined at a more general level. In other words, “clearly established”
law could be found in more general constitutional principles, rather
than sifting through precedent to find a factually identical case to
follow. As the Court explained in 2002 in Hope v. Pelzer, “officials can
still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in
novel factual circumstances.”43 Under Hope then, cases need not be
“fundamentally” or “materially” similar for there to be “clearly
established” law—all that is required is that the existing law “give
respondents fair warning” that the alleged conduct is
unconstitutional.44
This more relaxed approach to “clearly established” law quickly
yielded to a more exacting standard, with the Supreme Court often
chastising lower courts for defining “clearly established” law too
generally. In Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the Court admonished, “[w]e have
repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular … not to
define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”45 More
recent cases continue to echo this exacting standard.46 Accordingly, in
41. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816–819 (explaining that the subjective standard had proved
problematic, and that the test would be an objective one that looks to “clearly established” law to
determine if an officer should be granted immunity); see, e.g., Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (endorsing
the “clearly established” law standard); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (explaining
how the “clearly established” standard provides clarity and “fair warning.”).
42. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
43. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
44. Id. Thus, Hope made clear that a plaintiff did not have to find a case on all fours to satisfy
the “clearly established” law standard. Rather, the law could be sufficiently clear to provide fair
warning in situations where “a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law”
applied “with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though ‘the very action in
question has [not] previously been held unlawful.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987)).
45. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).
46. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (“We have repeatedly
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District of Columbia v. Wesby, the Court explained that the “existing
law must have placed the constitutionally of the officer’s conduct
‘beyond debate.’”47 Thus, under this “demanding standard,” “[i]t is not
enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent.”48
Instead, “[t]he precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable
official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff
seeks to apply.”49
This high level of specificity required in defining “clearly
established” law has been criticized by Justice Sotomayor.50 In a 2018
dissent, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that, under Hope, “[o]fficials
can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in
novel factual circumstances.”51 Justice Sotomayor went on to criticize
the majority for requiring a “factually identical case” to fulfill the test,
as the Court’s qualified immunity cases had “never required a factually
identical case to satisfy the ‘clearly established’ standard.”52 By
requiring such a case, Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority was
sending “an alarming signal to law enforcement officers and the public”
that officers “can shoot first and think later, and … palpably
unreasonable conduct will go unpunished.”53
The purpose of this section is to review the course the Court has
taken with regard to its qualified immunity jurisprudence. While the
Court’s qualified immunity test initially had a subjective component
that considered an officer’s motivation, that test was replaced by an
objective standard looking to whether the law was “clearly
established.” This “clearly established” law standard has led to
criticisms that it functionally requires a near identical case to overcome

stressed that courts must not ‘define clearly established law at a high level of generality, since
doing so avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular
circumstances that he or she faced.’” (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014)));
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152–53 (2018) (noting that “Specificity is especially important
in the Fourth Amendment context” and that “police officers are entitled to qualified immunity
unless existing precedent ‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue” (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam))); Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (citing al-Kidd 563 U.S. at 742 for
the proposition that “We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at
a high level of generality.”).
47. 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).
48. Id. at 590.
49. Id.
50. See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1155–62 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
outcome due to use of the highly specific standard).
51. Id. at 1159 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
52. Id. at 1161 (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 739).
53. Id. at 1162.
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immunity. Awareness of the Court’s current test and its evolution is
important to understanding the criticisms of the doctrine to which this
Article turns next.
C. Calls to Overturn or Reconsider Qualified Immunity
In recent years, calls to abolish or radically alter the qualified
immunity doctrine have intensified from a variety of voices. The Cato
Institute, a libertarian think tank, has made the elimination of qualified
immunity one of its top priorities, arguing “[t]he doctrine was invented
by the Supreme Court in the 1960s, with no basis [in] statutory text,
legislative intent, or sound public policy.”54 The American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”), a nonprofit dedicated to defending
individual rights and liberties, also announced its intent to end qualified
immunity.55 According to the ACLU, the “clearly established law” test
makes it “nearly impossible” to sue public officials and shields officers
from accountability.56 Black Lives Matter, an organization dedicated to
eradicating white supremacy, called on Congress and the White House
to take immediate action to make ending qualified immunity a top
priority.57 According to Black Lives Matter, officers are able “to hide
behind the guise of qualified immunity” to prevent being held
accountable for their actions.58 Even the Sierra Club, an environmental
organization, endorsed federal legislation “which would end qualified
immunity for police officers accused of wrongdoing.”59
Justice Thomas called attention to problems with the doctrine. In a
statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Hoggard v. Rhodes,
Justice Thomas argued that the Court’s “qualified immunity
jurisprudence stands on shaky ground” and the Court’s “clearly
established” law test, “cannot be located in § 1983’s text and may have

54. End Qualified Immunity, CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/qualified-immunity (last
visited Sept. 7, 2021).
55. See Ed Yonka et al., Ending Qualified Immunity Once and For All is the Next Step in
Holding Police Accountable, ACLU (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.aclu.org/news/criminal-lawreform/ending-qualified-immunity-once-and-for-all-is-the-next-step-in-holding-policeaccountable/ (noting opposition to qualified immunity and the difficulty of overcoming the
defense’s high standards).
56. Id.
57. Demand Congress End Qualified Immunity, BLACK LIVES MATTER (July 22, 2021),
https://blacklivesmatter.com/demand-congress-end-qualified-immunity.
58. Id.
59. Leslie Fields, Racial Justice Is Environmental Justice: The Sierra Club’s advocacy is
intersectionality in action, SIERRA CLUB (May 26, 2021), https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/racialjustice-environmental-justice.
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little basis in history.”60 Justice Thomas argued that the current
approach is “[not] grounded in the common-law backdrop against
which Congress enacted [§ 1983].”61 As suggested above, even if
qualified immunity is not found in the text of § 1983, the common-law
backdrop against which § 1983 was enacted may support its application.
But the Court is no longer looking to this backdrop to support its
position as it once did in Pierson and prior cases. According to Justice
Thomas, the Court has “‘substitute[d] [its] own policy preferences for
the mandates of Congress by conjuring up blanket immunity and then
fail[ing] to justify [its] enacted policy.”62 These policy preferences deal
with a “balancing of competing values about litigation costs and
efficiency.”63 Essentially, Justice Thomas contends that the Court has
abdicated its duty to interpret the law when it comes to qualified
immunity. Instead, in developing the current qualified immunity
framework, the Court is simply balancing competing policy interests,
which is supposed to be the role of “Congress, not the Courts.”64 Justice
Thomas believes that in the appropriate case, the Court should
fundamentally reconsider qualified immunity.65
The academic literature is similarly rife with criticisms of qualified

60. Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421, 2421 (2021) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the
denial of certiorari). See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870–71 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I write separately, however, to note my
growing concern with our qualified immunity jurisprudence.”); Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862,
1862 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (restating concerns with
qualified immunity as “stray[ing] from the statutory text”).
61. Hoggard, 141 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari)
(alternation in original).
62. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Ziglar, 137
S. Ct. 1843, 1872).
63. Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S.Ct. 1862, 1864 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
64. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1872 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
65. See Hoggard, 141 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of
certiorari) (stating that qualified immunity is not consistent with statutory text or history, and
therefore should be reconsidered); Baxter, 140 S. Ct. at 1862 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari) (reaffirming his previous concerns with qualified immunity and calling again
to reexamining the doctrine). Lower courts have also questioned the doctrine, while nonetheless
following the commands of the Supreme Court. For example, in a recent case before Judge
Carlton W. Reeves of the Southern District of Mississippi, Judge Reeves granted qualified
immunity because the law was not “clearly established” in a case in which an officer
unconstitutionally searched a plaintiff’s car. Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F.Supp.3d 386 (S.D. Miss.
2020). Despite granting qualified immunity, Judge Reeves criticized the doctrine noting that “the
harm in this case to one man sheds light on the harm done to the nation by this manufactured
doctrine.” Id. at 392.
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immunity and calls to overhaul the doctrine.66 This Article does not
weigh into that debate. Nevertheless, given the significant criticism and
widespread disagreement over the doctrine, it would appear that the
qualified immunity doctrine is ripe for reconsideration.
II. SHOULD STARE DECISIS GIVE WAY TO ALLOW FOR THE
OVERTURNING OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY?
Given this Article’s assumption that the Court erred when it
decided that qualified immunity was a defense to civil rights actions
under § 1983, the remainder of this Article examines whether stare
decisis should preclude overturning qualified immunity.
This part proceeds in three sections. Section A reviews the factors
the Court considers in its stare decisis analysis and highlights why stare
decisis considerations are traditionally heightened for statutory
precedents. Section B endorses a framework that best supports the
underlying values inherent in the concept of stare decisis. Section C
applies that framework, and particularly its emphasis on reliance
interests, to analyze whether the Court should overturn qualified
immunity. After considering qualified immunity under this framework,
this Article concludes that stare decisis should not preclude overruling
the “clearly established” law test for qualified immunity, but some form
of qualified immunity should nonetheless remain. Specifically, the
Court should revert to its framework under Pierson.
A. The Importance of Stare Decisis and the Factors the Court
Considers
The importance of stare decisis cannot be overstated in a legal
system that prides itself on the rule of law, stability, and impersonality
of the law. As one jurisprudential scholar has observed, the Court “has
lauded stare decisis as . . . contributing to ‘the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process.’”67 Stare decisis serves interests that are
66. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 7 at 1999 (“[Q]ualified immunity is a mess of the
Supreme Court’s making, and the Supreme Court should clean it up.”); Baude, supra note 7 at 88
(“[T]he doctrine lacks legal justification, and the Court’s justifications are unpersuasive.”);
Reinhardt, supra note 7 at 1254 (criticizing the Court’s current qualified immunity jurisprudence
as “risk[ing] turning federal judges from protectors of the Constitution into unreasoning deniers
of worthy claims of constitutional rights.”).
67. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, supra note 24, at 412–13 (citations omitted)
(quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827). See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (noting that when the Court “reexamines a prior
holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the
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paramount not just to the rule of law, but also the public’s support for
and trust in the legal system.
To serve these interests, the Court has enumerated various factors
to be considered in a stare decisis analysis. The first is workability. This
factor focuses on “whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply
in defying practical workability.”68 This factor looks to the ease by
which judges are able to interpret and apply the precedent. In fact,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the seminal case which considered the
importance of precedent established in Roe v. Wade, served as a
platform for the Court to underscore the workability of relying on
precedent: while “Roe ha[d] engendered opposition,” it had not proved
unworkable.69 The determinations required for judges to apply Roe’s
precedent fell “within judicial competence.”70 In other words, the test
was clear enough that judges could apply it without great difficulty.
The second factor is reliance. Under this factor the Court looks at
“whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to
the cost of repudiation.”71 In other words, the Court considers whether
individuals are making decisions in reliance on the continued existence
of the precedent. Thus, in Planned Parenthood, the Court concluded
that “while the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured,
neither can the certain cost of overruling Roe for people who have
ordered their thinking and living around that case be dismissed.”72
Where there is strong reliance on precedent, that precedent is unlikely
to be overturned.
The next factor examines the development of the law in other areas
and asks “whether related principles of law have so far developed as to
have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.”73
In other words, has jurisprudence developed in ways that render the
precedent a product of outdated thinking? For example, in Planned
Parenthood, the Court found that since Roe, constitutional law had not
developed in such a way to leave “Roe behind as a mere survivor of
obsolete constitutional thinking.”74 Thus, Roe’s legal underpinnings
rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”).
68. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965)).
69. Id. at 855 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 854 (citing United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 855 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173–174 (1989)).
74. Id. at 857.
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had not so developed to render its holding invalid.
The final factor to consider looks at the facts underlying a decision,
and asks “whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification.”75 Under this factor, advances in science or additional data
can shed light on the facts critical to an opinion. If these facts are shown
to be incorrect, the case for stare decisis is lessened. In Planned
Parenthood, advances in healthcare made for safe abortions to the
mother later in pregnancy, and therefore the point of viability was now
somewhat earlier than it was when Roe was decided.76 Nonetheless,
these changes to the underlying facts had no bearing on the ultimate
holding of Roe, “that viability marks the earliest point at which the
State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a
legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”77 Although some facts
underlying precedent might change, if they do not change so much that
a rule articulated in the prior case no longer applies, the precedent is
less susceptible to being overruled.
Typically, for questions of statutory construction, stare decisis
“applies with special force.”78 For example, in Kimble v. Marvel
Entertainment, LLC, the Court underscored the “enhanced force” of
stare decisis with regard to whether to overrule a precedent
interpreting a patent statute.79 Given that qualified immunity is a
defense to claims under § 1983, the doctrine raises questions of
statutory construction. Therefore, this heightened form of stare decisis
could apply to qualified immunity.
There are three different levels of stare decisis:
The U.S. Supreme Court gives strong effect to statutory

75. Id. at 855 (citing Burnet v. Colorado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)). See also Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020) (explaining the
traditional factors as “the quality of the decision’s reasoning; its consistency with related
decisions; legal developments since the decision; and reliance on the decision”); GARNER ET AL.,
supra note 23 at 404 (2016) (enumerating numerous factors which militate against overruling
precedent: the decision has stood unchallenged for many years; the same or other courts have
approved and followed the decision in many later decisions; the decisions have been universally
accepted, acted on, and acquiesced in by courts, the legal profession, and the general public; the
decision has become a rule of property; reliance has been placed on the prior decision: contracts
have been made, business transacted, and rights adjusted in reliance on the decision for a long
time or to a great extent; the prior decision involved interpreting a statute).
76. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
77. Id.
78. GARNER ET AL., supra note 23, at 333 (2016).
79. 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015).
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precedents, medium effect to common-law precedents, and
weaker effect to constitutional precedents. With statutory
interpretation, unlike (for practical purposes) constitutional
interpretation, the legislature can alter an erroneous statutory
holding. Hence courts generally won’t depart from a settled
judicial interpretation of a statute even if the earlier holding is
of questionable validity.80

To decide whether to overrule a case that interprets a statute, the
same factors still apply.81 The Court does not apply a different stare
decisis test to statutory precedents, but rather stare decisis simply
“carries enhanced force.”82
B. The Optimal Test for Stare Decisis
Underlying the doctrine of stare decisis is a commitment to the rule
of law, the impersonality of our system of justice, and the stability,
continuity, predictability, integrity and perceived integrity of our legal
system. How can these interests best be served through a stare decisis
analysis? Stated differently, what does a stare decisis framework look
like if its goal is to advance these interests? In his work on stare decisis,
Prof. Kozel developed a theory aimed at enhancing these commitments
while “insulat[ing] stare decisis from disputes over interpretive
philosophy.”83 Because our legal system encompasses longstanding
disagreement over interpretation, a theory of stare decisis requires a
theory “attuned to the challenges of judicial disagreement and the
value of precedent in overcoming them.”84 The key problem arises in
developing a test for stare decisis that judges can apply in a neutral way
regardless of where they fall on the philosophical spectrum.85
80. Id. at 334–35 (footnotes omitted).
81. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456–62 (2015) (noting the
“superpowered form of stare decisis” for decisions interpreting a statute and then going on to
analyze the traditional factors of reliance, workability, legal underpinnings and factual
underpinnings).
82. Id. at 456 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–173 (1989)).
83. RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 103 (2017)
[hereinafter KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT].
84. See id. at 6. (Prof. Kozel explains the problem with the Court’s current stare decisis
jurisprudence as follows: “the problem with the Supreme Court’s current approach to precedent
is not that the justices are behaving in an unprincipled manner. The problem is that the modern
doctrine of stare decisis is undermined by principled disagreements among justices acting in good
faith. The doctrine’s structure and composition all but guarantee that conclusions about the
durability of precedent will track the justices’ individual views about whether decisions are right
or wrong and whether mistakes are harmful or benign”).
85. See id. at 13. (“In our world of pervasive interpretive disagreement, we need to think
about the role of precedent differently than we would under conditions of widespread interpretive
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Under Prof. Kozel’s approach, those core “factors that are
susceptible to principled application by justices across the
philosophical spectrum” are “a decision’s procedural workability, the
accuracy of its factual premises, and the reliance it has yielded.”86
Because these factors are the ones that inoculate a stare decisis analysis
from philosophical ideologies, their application enhances the values
that stare decisis is intended to advance.87
It should be noted that Prof. Kozel’s framework is designed to
respond to stare decisis in the context of constitutional interpretation,
as opposed to statutory or common law. Yet, as Prof. Kozel notes,
although “[t]he intricacies of constitutional stare decisis” are his focus,
“many aspects of [the] analysis will apply to statutory (and common
law) decisions as well.”88
There are several reasons why Prof. Kozel’s framework should
apply with equal force to statutory precedents—especially
controversial precedent like the Court’s qualified immunity
jurisprudence. First, Prof. Kozel’s work focuses on developing a system
of stare decisis that can furnish common ground to judges who see the
law through different philosophical and methodological lenses. This
noble goal should also apply to statutory precedents, especially one as
thorny as the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence. Moreover, as
will be explained more fully in section C.1., there is good reason to be
skeptical about statutory precedent receiving greater deference,
especially in the context of qualified immunity.
Before analyzing qualified immunity under the stare decisis
framework advanced by Prof. Kozel, it is worth elaborating on the three
core factors advanced by Prof. Kozel. Procedural workability—the
degree to which courts, litigants, and others can understand and apply
a precedent—is analyzed first. In applying this factor, the critical step

harmony. The question is no longer which factors are potentially relevant to a precedent’s
retention or overruling. The inquiry must be narrowed to include only those factors that are
susceptible to principled application by justices across the philosophical spectrum.”).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., id. at 110 (explaining that a principled application of procedural workability
“does not depend on whether a particular justice is an originalist, a pragmatist, or a common law
constitutionalist” and this thus makes it appropriate for the doctrine of stare decisis in a world of
interpretive pluralism); id. at 113 (explaining that a principled application of the accuracy of the
factual premises factor “is not bound up with any particular methodology of interpretation”
making it an appropriate consideration); id. at 116 (explaining that “the neutrality of reliance
expectations might help to explain their prominent status in the modern doctrine, which itself
provides further reason for preserving reliance as part of the stare decisis calculus.”).
88. Id. at 8.
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becomes “rejecting the premise that a precedent becomes unworkable
because a justice disagrees with its rationale or is troubled by its
results.”89 This factor examines “whether courts, litigants, and other
stakeholders have been able to understand and apply a rule without
undue difficulty.”90 Thus, “[a] rule of decision that is hopelessly
convoluted or exceedingly vague renders a precedent unworkable
regardless of its rationale and substantive effects.”91
The next factor to consider is factual accuracy. Here, “[a]s with their
treatment of workability, courts occasionally conflate diagnoses of
factual error with assessments of a precedent’s legal reasoning.”92
Under this factor, factual content should be understood narrowly and
“driven by empirical observations that do not depend on
methodological or normative commitments.”93
The next factor to consider is reliance.94 To insulate the reliance
analysis from “debates about interpretive philosophy,” courts must
focus on “concrete expectations of stakeholders” as opposed to more
abstract and vague notions of reliance.95 Thus, private reliance and
governmental reliance do matter, but the more nebulous concept of
“societal reliance” does not hold weight.96
In addition to the three Kozel factors, a fourth factor is also
“susceptible to principled application by justices across the

89. Id. at 110.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 111.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 116 (“Reliance interests have a sweep that exceeds methodological bounds . . .
. [t]his breadth brings its own kind of neutrality . . . . [i]ndeed, the neutrality of reliance
expectations might help to explain their prominent status in the modern doctrine, which itself
provides further reason for preserving reliance as part of the stare decisis calculus going
forward.”); see also Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, supra note 24, at 414 (“Most of the
considerations that populate the Court’s current [stare decisis] jurisprudence are best
understood—or perhaps, reimagined—as efforts to gauge the reliance interests that would be
affected by the decision to overrule a given precedent.” Kozel goes on to argue that the Court
should clear the proxies for reliance and instead “construct a new framework for rigorous and
systematic analysis of the underlying reliance interests themselves”).
95. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT, supra note 97, at 116-17.
Kozel provides two examples of where the Court has looked to societal reliance in its stare decisis
analysis. In Planned Parenthood, “the Court recognized the interests of ‘people who have ordered
their thinking and living around’ the continued vitality of Roe” and in Miranda “the Court cited
the status of the Miranda warnings as ‘part of our national culture.’” Id. at 117 (first citing Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992); and then Dickerson
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 428 (2000)).
96. Id. at 118.
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philosophical spectrum.”97 The final factor is whether overturning a
decision leads to the complete elimination of a right or defense, or
simply a modification to it. This inquiry should be a straightforward
endeavor: if a right or defense is completely eliminated, such
elimination weighs in favor of retaining the precedent. Underlying this
fourth factor is the idea that the elimination of a right or defense is
more detrimental to the stability and continuity of law than simply
modifying a legal rule. Moreover, there is likely to be more individual
and societal reliance on the existence of a right or defense, as opposed
to the particular contours that right or defense takes as formulated by
the Court.98 This fourth factor is particularly important in the qualified
immunity context, as qualified immunity is a defense.
Indeed, this concept already exists, at least implicitly, in the Court’s
stare decisis jurisprudence. The Court has implied that the doctrine of
stare decisis becomes weaker in cases where an underlying right or
defense is preserved, even if its procedural limits or scope are slightly
modified. For example, in Planned Parenthood, the Court
acknowledged the need to uphold the basic underpinnings of Roe,
while modifying the procedural limits in exercising those rights.99
C. Applying the Optimal Test for Stare Decisis to Qualified
Immunity.
Now that this Article has developed an optimal test for stare decisis,
this stare decisis framework can be used to analyze whether the Court’s
qualified immunity jurisprudence should be overruled. Before
applying this optimal test, however, this Article must address why the
heightened form of stare decisis reserved for statutory cases should not
apply to the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence.
1. Heightened Stare Decisis for Statutory Cases Should Not Apply
to Qualified Immunity.
The Court and legal scholars typically advance two reasons why
stare decisis should apply with particular force to statutory cases: that
“Congress’ failure to revise a judicial interpretation might be a form of
acquiescence” and that the Court should not vacillate after a statutory
97. Id. at 13.
98. Cf. id. at 117 (noting that “[t]he objectives served by protecting societal reliance are
promoted to a considerable extent by the very existence of a meaningful doctrine of stare
decisis”).
99. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871–73 (“We reject the trimester framework, which we do not
consider to be part of the essential holding of Roe.”).
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issue has been settled.100 Both of these reasons are suspect, especially
as applied to qualified immunity.
First, even if Congress has not acted, a conclusion cannot be drawn
purely from such inaction that it has acquiesced to the Court’s ruling,
as there are various reasons for congressional inaction.101 This could be
anything from political gridlock to other issues topping Congress’s
agenda. Second, even if Congress’s failure to override the Court
represents acquiescence, this acquiescence is irrelevant for statutory
interpretation. After all, this is only the intent of the current Congress.
In interpreting the statute, the intent of the Congress that passed the
statute, as opposed to the Congress that currently presides, is the intent
that matters.102
Both of these criticisms apply with particular force to qualified
immunity. First, Congressional inaction in the case of qualified
immunity should not be viewed as consent to the Court’s precedents.
Again, there could be a variety of reasons, including today’s heated
political environment and other issues at the top of the legislative
docket, to explain why today’s Congress has not altered qualified
immunity. Thus, this inaction does not necessarily signal approval of the
status quo. In today’s ultra-partisan political environment,
accomplishing significant reform to something like qualified immunity
likely reflects difficulties in the political process than the current
Congress’s acceptance of the Court’s qualified immunity
jurisprudence.
Second, even if the current Congress’s inaction on qualified
immunity signals its acquiescence, the current Congress’s intent is not
the intent that matters. The relevant congressional intent is that of the
Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which included §
1983. Moreover, given the historical context in which the Civil Rights

100. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT, supra note 97, at 25
101. See KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT, supra note 97, at 25 (first citing Kimble v. Marvel
Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 471–72 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting); then Johnson v. Transp. Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (“Congress’s failure to amend a statute might be
for reasons other than its agreement with the judiciary’s interpretation, such as the limited
capacity of the legislative agenda.”); Brian C. Kalt, Three Levels of Stare Decisis: Distinguishing
Common-Law, Constitutional, and Statutory Cases, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 277, 279–80 (2004)
(“[L]egislatures do all sorts of things for all sorts of reasons.”).
102. Id. (“It is not clear why that position should matter to a court charged with interpreting
a statute that was enacted by a prior Congress . . . Presumably it is the latter whose understanding
is most relevant to disputed questions of statutory interpretation”); Kalt, supra note 116, at 280
(“[T]he legislature that passed the initial legislation might be long gone and the new legislature
might be no better a guardian of the meaning of the original law than the new court is.”).
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Act was passed, there is good reason to believe that today’s Congress
has a much different set of priorities than its predecessor. As Justice
Thomas explained: “In the wake of the Civil War, Republicans set out
to secure certain individual rights against abuse by the States…. Armed
with its new enforcement powers, Congress sought to respond to ‘the
reign of terror imposed by the Klan upon black citizens and their white
sympathizers in the Southern States.’”103 It is against this backdrop that
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871.104 While the Congress that
passed the Civil Rights Act was concerned with securing individual
rights in the wake of the Civil War, today’s Congress may be more
motivated by securing campaign donations through exhibitions of
extreme partisanship.105 Additionally, there is no reason to think that
today’s Congress is better suited at understanding the enacting
Congress’ intent than the Court. Thus, even if congressional inaction on
qualified immunity can be interpreted as acquiescence with the Court’s
prior precedents, this is ultimately irrelevant.
The argument that the Court should not vacillate after an issue has
been settled is also problematic in the qualified immunity context
because the Court has already materially altered the test. Significantly,
the Court changed the subjective test under Pierson to today’s “clearly
established” law standard.106 Because the Court has already amended
qualified immunity before, the argument that it should not further
adjust the standard carries less force.
Finally, heightened stare decisis should not apply to the Court’s
“clearly established” law test because the Court’s precedent should not
be seen as typical statutory interpretation.107 In changing the test to the
103. Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S.Ct. 1862 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
104. Id.
105. The New Yorker, A Retiring Democrat Places Blame for Paralysis in Congress, at
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/tears-from-a-democrat-as-paralysis-grips-congress
(highlighting Representative John Yarmuth’s view that “Congress was taken over by mediaobsessed performance artists, who would rather attract attention than govern” and that “[t]he
growing need to please big campaign donors. . .has played a huge part in democracy’s
breakdown”).
106. See Michelman, supra note 7, at 2008–10 (2018) (noting that the “Court’s policymaking
tendencies have been particularly acute regarding qualified immunity, in which the doctrinal
twists and turns have” included a variety of decisions and “indeed, the Court itself has
acknowledged that it has been ‘forthright in revising the immunity defense for policy reasons’”)
(citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594 n.15 (1998)); Baude, supra note 9 at 81 (noting
that the Court “has openly tinkered with [qualified immunity] to an unusual degree.”).
107. See Michelman, supra note 9, at 2009 (“In light of the Court’s leading role in this area of
law,” some “have argued that § 1983 should be treated for purposes of statutory stare decisis as a
common-law statute like the Sherman Act—an area that Congress expects the Court to shape and
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“clearly established” law standard, the Court was not interpreting a
statutory term like the Court would do in a typical statutory case, but
rather crafting a defense largely for policy reasons.108 As noted earlier,
and as Justice Thomas has observed, the Court’s adoption of the
“clearly established” law test is best seen as “a balancing of competing
values about litigation costs and efficiency.”109 In rationalizing its
departure from the Pierson test for qualified immunity, the Court
explained that the subjective component of the Pierson test led to a
variety of negative effects.110 The Court sought to mitigate
“insubstantial claims” proceeding to trial, “distraction of officials from
their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action,
…deterrence of able people from public service,” and the “disrupti[on]
of effective government.”111 In response to these policy objectives, the
Court withdrew from the subjective test and adopted the “clearly
established” law standard. In other words, instead of interpreting the
words of a statute to give effect to Congress’ intent, the Court deviated
from precedent and created the “clearly established” law standard to
achieve certain policy objectives.

refine.” (citing Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to
Sources of Law, 42 STAN L. REV. 51, 57 (1989))); id. at 2013 (“The special judicial power to craft
a remedy in this area logically includes the power to define the contours of that remedy and its
limits. That power, combined with fifty years’ worth of history of treating § 1983 like a commonlaw statute that Congress expects the Court to interpret, overcomes the usually rigorous
application of stare decisis in the context of statutory precedents.”); Baude, supra note 9, at 80
(“[I]t is not entirely clear that the Court views qualified immunity as a purely statutory rule, as
opposed to a constitutionally protected one”); id. at 81 (“Felix Frankfurter argued that
reconsidering the interpretation of Section 1983 was ‘the Court’s responsibility’ because it was
not ‘merely a mine-run statutory question,’ but rather one that ‘has significance approximating
constitutional dimension’” (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 221–22 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting))).
108. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814–19 (1982) (explaining that the “balancing of
competing interests” required an adjustment to the “good faith test” standard for qualified
immunity); see also Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421, 2422 (2021) (Thomas, J., statement
respecting the denial of certiorari) (noting that that the Court has “‘substituted [its] own policy
preferences for the mandates of Congress’ by conjuring up blanket immunity and then failed to
justify [its] enacted policy.”); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment ) (“Until we shift the focus of our inquiry to whether
immunity existed at common law, we will continue to substitute our own policy preferences for
the mandates of Congress.”); Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1864 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari) (noting that the Court adopted the “clearly established law” test
“not because of general principles of tort immunities and defenses . . . but because of a balancing
of competing values about litigation costs and efficiency.”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
109. Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S.Ct. 1862, 1864 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
110. Harlow, 102 S.Ct. at 2737-2738.
111. Id.
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Some legal scholars argue that it does not matter that qualified
immunity analysis is not typical statutory interpretation, and therefore,
heightened statutory stare decisis should still apply.112 These scholars
rely on Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC to argue that “the
‘enhanced’ form of stare decisis for statutes applies even if the Court’s
earlier decision looked beyond the law’s text and instead relied on its
sense of ‘the policies and purposes’ behind the statute.”113
This argument carries weight as applied to Pierson, where the Court
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and found implicit support for
qualified immunity within the statute itself since the statute did not
explicitly abrogate the common law that existed at the time of
enactment. But, the Court’s analysis in Harlow is different. In Harlow,
the analysis of the proper test for qualified immunity was no longer
grounded in the common law backdrop in which the Civil Rights Act
was enacted, nor did the Court announce a judicially created doctrine
designed to implement a federal statute.114 Instead, the Court crafted a
defense similar to what they would do in common law or constitutional
cases.
Finally, the Court employed no stare decisis analysis when it failed
to embrace the test in Pierson and adopted the test in Harlow.
Therefore, it would seem odd that the Court would be required to apply
heightened stare decisis if it were to consider overruling Harlow now.
2. Procedural Workability
Given that the heightened form of stare decisis reserved for
statutory cases should not apply to qualified immunity, especially with
regard to the Harlow decision announcing the “clearly established” law
test, this Article now applies the optimal stare decisis framework to
qualified immunity.
The procedural workability factor weighs in favor of overruling the
Court’s “clearly established” law test for qualified immunity. As
highlighted earlier, the degree of specificity required in defining
112. See Nielson & Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, supra note 14, at
1856 (pointing to the Court’s holding in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment that “stare decisis carries
enhanced force” in statutory cases); see also Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Qualified
Immunity and Federalism, 109 GEO. L. J. 229, 250 (2020) [hereinafter, Nielson & Walker,
Qualified Immunity and Federalism].
113. Nielson & Walker, Qualified Immunity and Federalism, supra note 131, at 250 (citing
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015)).
114. See Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421, 2421–22 (2021) (Thomas, J., statement
respecting the denial of certiorari).
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“clearly established” law has led to much confusion in the lower courts.
Again, the Court tacitly acknowledged this in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
lamenting that “[w]e have repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth
Circuit in particular . . . not to define clearly established law at a high
level of generality.”115 Reaching the level of specificity required by this
test continues to prove difficult for courts and litigants, not just the
Ninth Circuit. In District of Columbia v. Wesby, the Court overturned a
denial of qualified immunity because the D.C. Circuit Court and the
lower court erred in their “clearly established” law analysis.116 The
Court explained that the D.C. Circuit relied on a single decision to find
that it was “clearly established” that the officers did not have probable
cause to arrest, but that case was not sufficiently analogous to “say
anything about whether the officers here” had probable cause given the
unique evidence.117 According to the Court, the D.C. Circuit failed to
“identify[] a single precedent—much less a controlling case or robust
consensus of cases—finding a Fourth Amendment violation ‘under
similar circumstances.’”118 As these examples demonstrate, the “clearly
established” law test is problematic. It continues to create much
confusion regarding just how much specificity is required in identifying
“clearly established” law. The frequency with which lower courts
identify the level of specificity incorrectly in defining “clearly
established” law suggests the test has significant workability issues.119
The “clearly established” law test generates errors in the opposite
direction as well. For example, in Estate of Jones v. Martinsburg, the
Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment
on qualified immunity grounds where the lower court identified
“clearly established” law at too specific a level.120 There, the lower
115. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194,
198–99 (2004) (per curiam)).
116. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 591 (2018).
117. Id. at 591 (this unique evidence included the following: “[t]he officers found a group of
people in a house that the neighbors had identified as vacant, that appeared to be vacant, and that
the partygoers were treating as vacant;” [t]he group scattered, and some hid, at the sight of law
enforcement;” the group’s “explanations for being at the house were full of holes;” and “[t]he
source of their claimed invitation admitted that she had no right to be in the house, and the owner
confirmed that fact”).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., id. (“We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not ‘define clearly
established law at a high level of generality.’” (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 770
(2014))); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (“We have repeatedly told courts—and the
Ninth Circuit in particular . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”).
120. See Estate of Jones v. Martinsburg, 961 F.3d 661, 670 (4th Cir. 2020) (after conducting a
“clearly established” law analysis quoting another Fourth Circuit case for the proposition that
“Indeed, it is just common sense that [shooting] someone who is already incapacitated is not
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court found that “shoot[ing] a man 22 times as he lay motionless on the
ground” did not violate “clearly established” law.121 The lower court
made this conclusion because the particular facts of the case did “not
squarely align with the established precedent.”122 The Fourth Circuit
found the lower court’s analysis too exacting and noted that “it is just
common sense that [shooting] someone who is already incapacitated is
not justified under these circumstances.”123 The Martinsburg case
further highlights the difficulty of defining “clearly established” at the
adequate level of specificity. As one legal scholar put it, trying to
determine “at what level of specificity a legal principle has been
established can devolve into an almost metaphysical exercise” in which
judges are required “to make a legal determination based on vague and
malleable concepts.”124
Although the Court altered the Pierson qualified immunity test due
to purported workability concerns, the resulting test does not preclude
similar criticisms. In Harlow, the Court removed the qualified
immunity test’s subjective component largely because the “good faith”
test was too generous to plaintiffs, led to substantial costs associated
with subjecting government officials to the risk of trial, and could cause
the disruption of effective government.125 The Court explained that the
ease with which plaintiffs could defeat the subjective “good faith”
component on a motion for summary judgment unduly subjected more
government officials to trial and discovery.126 Thus, the Court found that
the subjective component of the test was unworkable when it came to
achieving a desirable balance of competing values.127 While at first
glance, the Court’s comments in Harlow may appear to go to
procedural workability, they do not under the stare decisis framework
advanced by Prof. Kozel. In applying this factor, it is critical that a jurist
“reject[] the premise that a precedent becomes unworkable because a
justice … is troubled by its results.”128 The change in the test from
Pierson to Harlow is more a reflection of dissatisfaction with the
justified under these circumstances.”)
121. Id.
122. Estate of Jones v. Martinsburg, 2018 WL 4289325, at *5 (N.D. W.Va. Sept. 7, 2018)
123. Estate of Jones v. Martinsburg, 961 F.3d 661, 670 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Brockington
v, Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 508 (4th Cir. 2011)).
124. Michelman, supra note 9 at 2016.
125. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–17 (1982).
126. Id. at 816–17.
127. Id. at 816-817 (noting that the test needed to be changed consistent with the balancing
of competing values it had previously tried to achieve).
128. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT supra note 96, at 110.
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negative externalities yielded by the Pierson test for litigants, than of
the ability of judges to properly apply the test. In other words, it was
not that judges were not competent to apply the test, but rather the
Court did not deem the Pierson test was sufficiently protective to
government officials.
Thus, the workability factor weighs in favor of allowing stare decisis
to give way to overturn the Court’s “clearly established” law test for
qualified immunity. That the original “good faith” test tipped the scales
too much in favor of plaintiffs in the Court’s eyes does not factor into
the workability analysis.
3. Factual Accuracy
The next factor to consider is factual accuracy. Qualified immunity
necessitates certain factual assumptions underlying the Court’s
qualified immunity precedents. The basic assumption is that the officers
would be chilled in their duties if they were not entitled to some form
of immunity for their actions taken in good faith.129 Thus, in Pierson,
before fashioning a qualified immunity defense based on good faith
and probable cause, the Court noted, “[a] policeman’s lot is not so
unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction
of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being
mulcted in damages if he does.”130 Similarly, in Harlow, the Court
explained that government officials are entitled to some form of
immunity because this protection is needed “to shield them from undue
interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of
liability.”131
Qualified immunity further requires the assumption that officers
who are chilled in their duties impose certain costs on municipal
governance. The Court elaborated on the costs to society from suits
against public officers:
These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the
deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.
Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will “dampen
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible

129. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (describing the standard for police officer
conduct); see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813 (“The resolution of immunity questions inherently
requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative.”).
130. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555.
131. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806.
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[public officials] in the unflinching discharge of their duties.”132

The factual assumptions underlying Pierson and Harlow have a
logical appeal. If officers are not entitled to immunity, they are likely
to be chilled in their duties as they try to avoid being sued. However,
many scholars have pushed back on the assumption that without
qualified immunity, officers will be overwhelmed with money damages
because most officers are entitled to indemnity from their employers.133
Indemnification schemes shield officers from personally paying money
damages if they are sued for conduct arising out of the course of their
employment. Thus, the factual assumptions underlying Pierson and
Harlow may be flawed. In other words, in order to be protected against
suit, officers do not need the broad protection of immunity, they just
need indemnity. Theoretically, officers who know they have the backing
of indemnity will not be chilled in their duties.
This near universal scheme of indemnification may be changing.
Since the killing of George Floyd and renewed debate on policing,
some states and localities have reconsidered qualified immunity and/or
indemnification for officers.134 In June 2020, Colorado passed a state
law cause of action analogous to the federal § 1983 civil rights claim.135
Under this cause of action, qualified immunity is not a defense, and
officers can be personally responsible for as much as $25,000 of any
judgment or settlement if the officer’s employer determines “that the
officer did not act upon a good faith and reasonable belief that the
action was lawful.”136
Thus, while some of the factual assumptions underlying the Court’s
qualified immunity precedents are problematic given the near
universal system of indemnification, they are not completely erroneous
either, given the uncertainty surrounding the future of indemnification
provisions. This change accords less weight to arguments that

132. Id. at 814.
133. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 9 at 2014 (“[O]fficials avoid liability because of the near
universal government practice of indemnifying employees.”); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014); Nielson & Walker, Qualified Immunity and
Federalism, supra note 131 at 268–72; Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity and Federalism
All the Way Down, 109 GEO. L . J. 305, 330–33 (2020) [hereinafter Schwartz, Qualified Immunity
and Federalism All the Way Down].
134. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-131 (2021); An Act Concerning Police
Accountability, H.R. 6004, 2020 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Conn. 2020); S.R. 20-217, 72nd Gen. Assemb.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020); H.R. 4, 55th Leg., First Sess. (N.M. 2021); Press Release, supra note
7; NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGS, supra note 7.
135. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-131 (2021).
136. Id.
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indemnity provides sufficient protection. Nonetheless, because there
are at least some inaccuracies in the Court’s factual assumptions given
the system of indemnification, this factor also weighs slightly in favor
of stare decisis yielding to overrule qualified immunity.
4. Reliance
The final factor to consider is reliance. Before analyzing this factor,
a distinction should be made: the degree to which stakeholders
(individuals and entities making decisions based on qualified immunity
including, but not limited to, police officers and police departments)
rely on the “clearly established” law test may be very different than the
degree to which stakeholders rely on some form of qualified immunity
for reasonable, good faith mistakes. The experiences in localities that
have abandoned qualified immunity, such as Colorado and New York
City, are providing a natural experiment on how much officers and
police departments do actually rely on the doctrine. Although it is too
early to determine the impacts of abolishing qualified immunity, there
appears to be some anecdotal evidence of reliance. For example, after
the passage of a new bill abolishing qualified immunity in Colorado,
some police departments saw an uptick in resignations.137 A survey
“found that the law enforcement leaders believe [Colorado’s police
reform legislation] was one of the main factors for people leaving,”138
with 65 percent of respondents citing it as a reason for officer
departures.139
Abolishing qualified immunity may have some impact on retention
and recruitment as well. For example, data shows a steep decline in new
officer hires across Colorado.140 Moreover, according to a survey of

137. See Elise Schmelzer, Did Colorado Law Enforcement Flee the Profession in 2020?
Depends on the Department., DENVER POST (Mar. 8, 2021, 6:00 AM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2021/03/08/colorado-police-sheriffs-leaving-2020/ (In a survey of 69
Colorado police chiefs and sheriffs, “[a]bout half of the surveyed leaders who lost law
enforcement employees in the last six months said attrition rates were higher than the year
before.”); To be clear, as qualified immunity is a defense to federal civil rights claims, Colorado
cannot eliminate it. The new Colorado law simply creates a state law cause of action and makes
clear that qualified immunity is not a defense to that state law cause of action. The end result is
that individuals can now bring state law claims analogous to what they could bring under § 1983
and officers cannot rely on qualified immunity as a defense to those claims. COLO. REV. STAT. §
13-21-131 (2021)
138. Id.
139. Press Release, County Sheriffs of Colorado, Survey Outlines Challenges, Opportunities
for Colorado Law Enforcement (Mar. 8, 2021) (on file with author).
140. See Schmelzer, supra note 154 (“Agencies reported 1,610 hires in 2020, down from the
2,378 recorded in 2019 and the 2,801 recorded in 2018.”).
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chiefs and sheriffs, approximately 73 percent of Colorado law
enforcement leaders reported a shortage of full-time officers and 51
percent reported that the shortage was worse than a year ago.141
Almost three-quarters of the chiefs and sheriffs reported fewer
applications to work for their agencies compared to a year ago.142
According to one County Sheriff, in the past nine months, her
department did not have “a single applicant who was qualified to be a
patrol deputy.”143
Although the attrition rate increased significantly in some counties,
this trend does not necessarily indicate that officers are leaving the
force because of the loss of qualified immunity—such a finding would
require further research. Even if the police reform legislation is driving
officers away, that too is complicated, as the end of qualified immunity
is just one piece of that legislation.144 Nonetheless, this evidence
suggests that police departments rely on qualified immunity for hiring
and recruitment purposes. Moreover, there is a logical appeal to
arguments that the loss of qualified immunity hurts recruitment and
retention of even the most well-intentioned officers. By removing
qualified immunity, officers lose a defense to claims made against them,
including claims for actions made in good faith where the law is not
clear and that involve split-second and sometimes life or death
decision-making. The loss of this defense makes it more likely that an
officer will be sued and face liability for their actions. This in turn makes
the position less desirable to anyone who does not want to be
embroiled by claims, ensuing litigation, and the possibility of a
judgment against them. All else being equal, a position that becomes
less desirable makes individuals more likely to leave, or never join in
the first place.
Apart from hiring and retention, there is also the question of the
degree to which officers and departments rely on qualified immunity in
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. Similarly, critics of the New York City legislation removing qualified immunity have
argued that the reform “will hurt the recruitment and retention of qualified officers.” Tyler
Kendall, New York City Limits Qualified Immunity, Making it Easier to Sue Police for
Misconduct, CBS NEWS (Mar. 27, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nyc-qualified-immunitypolice-misconduct/. According to New York City Councilman Robert F. Holden, “[e]nding
qualified immunity will prevent the best young men and women in our city from joining the police
force.” Jeffery C. Mays & Ashley Southall, It May Soon Be Easier to Sue the N.Y.P.D. for
Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/nyregion/nycqualified-immunity-police-reform.html.
144. Schmelzer, supra note 154; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-131 (2021).
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the performance of their duties. Again, the Court has suggested that
without qualified immunity, officers might be less inclined to zealously
perform their duties.145 Police union responses to qualified immunity
reform are similarly instructive: in response to the effort to eliminate
qualified immunity in New York City, the union that represents NYPD
officers, the Police Benevolent Association, noted that the legislation
would “chill the operations of law enforcement.”146 Similarly, the
Executive Director of America’s largest police labor organization, the
Fraternal Order of Police, contends that ending qualified immunity is
“going to have a chilling effect on the kind of appropriately aggressive
policing that has helped drive crime rates to historic lows.”147
Anecdotal evidence further suggests that officers and departments
rely on qualified immunity in the performance of their duties, and that
removing it will impact the operation of law enforcement. In response
to the legislation in New York City, unions representing the police,
sergeants, and captains of the NYPD issued guidance to its officers.148
That guidance noted the following:
As a direct result of the passage of this law, and the
unavailability of the defense of qualified immunity under its
provisions, we advise that you proceed with caution when
taking any police action which could lead to physical
engagement with any person, and avoid physical engagement
to the greatest extent possible while also assuring your own
safety and the safety of others. Also, you are strongly cautioned
against engaging in any stop & frisk (unless doing so for your
own or other’s safety), search of a car, residence, or person
unless you are certain that you are clearly and unequivocally
within the bounds of the law, notwithstanding that your actions
may be taken in good faith.149

If this directive is heeded, in light of the elimination of qualified
145. See supra discussion in Part III.C.3. See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814
(1982) (“[D]ampen[ing] the ardor [of police officers] . . . in the unflinching discharge of their
duties.”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (noting tension between “dereliction of duty if
[police officer] does not arrest” with “being mulcted in damages if he does.”).
146. Press Release, Police Benevolent Association, PBA Blasts City Council’s Anti-Cop Bills
Amid Subway Violence Surge (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.nycpba.org/press-releases/2021/pbablasts-city-councils-anti-cop-bills-amid-subway-violence-surge/.
147. Zusha Elinson & Dan Frosch, New Mexico Makes it Easier to Sue Police, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 7, 2021, 3:25 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-mexico-makes-it-easier-to-sue-police11617823548.
148. Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n of the N.Y. Police Dep’t (@SBANYPD), TWITTER (Apr.
1, 2021, 4:21 PM), https://twitter.com/SBANYPD/status/1383168759997870085/photo/1.
149. Id.
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immunity in New York City, police officers are more likely to act with
extreme caution, and avoid zealous policing in situations presenting
novel factual scenarios where the law may not be immediately clear.
Thus, there is an argument that officers and their unions have relied on
qualified immunity in performing their duties.
If abolishing qualified immunity causes shortages in police forces
or less active policing, private citizens’ reliance interests are potentially
implicated to the extent that crime rates are related to qualified
immunity. As explained above, qualified immunity arguably fosters
more zealous policing in situations where officers are confronted with
novel factual situations. Therefore, qualified immunity encourages
officers to be more proactive—in turn, crime rates ostensibly remain
low.150 Further, individuals make a variety of decisions based in part on
crime rate data and the presence of a well-functioning police
department in their community, including where to live151, whether to
150. While more social science research is necessary on whether police pulling back and
shortages of officers will lead to increased crime, there is at least some evidence to suggest that
officers pulling back, and shortages will in fact lead to more crime. See Jason Johnson, Why
Violent Crime Surged After Police Across America Retreated (Apr. 9, 2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/2021/04/09/violent-crime-surged-acrossamerica-after-police-retreated-column/7137565002/ (explaining the reduction in proactive
policing has resulted in record high crime rates for cities across the U.S. Last year, New York
arrested 45,000 fewer individuals compared to previous years however there was a 58 percent
increase in homicides. Similarly, Chicago made 31,000 fewer arrests yet the murder rate increased
by 65 percent. In at least ten major cities in the U.S. violent crimes increased while “engaged
policing fell.”); David C. Pyrooz et al., Was There a Ferguson Effect on Crime Rates in Large U.S.
Cities?, 46 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 1, 3 (2016) (theorizing that after the shooting of a black man in
Ferguson, Missouri, police may have become hesitant to respond to crime which could have led
to increased crime rates); Eric Westervelt, Cops Say Low Morale and Department Scrutiny Are
Driving
Them
Away
From
the
Job
(June
24,
2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/06/24/1009578809/cops-say-low-morale-and-department-scrutiny-aredriving-them-away-from-the-job (explaining there is a correlation between increasing crime rates
nationwide and the drop in police staffing rates. Many departments are experiencing reduced
staffing numbers due to officers retiring, resigning, or the lack of new recruits.); Greta Kaul,
Minneapolis is Hiring More Police Officers, Here’s Why Some Advocates Argue That Won’t Make
the City Any Safer, MINN. POST (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.minnpost.com/politicspolicy/2016/12/minneapolis-hiring-more-police-officers-here-s-why-some-advocates-argue-won/
(noting “If Minneapolis doesn’t have enough officers, ‘[t]hey will simply be managing a 911 call
load—you will see crime as a whole increase because that’s exactly what happened’ when police
departments were understaffed previously.” The article continues to explain that there is a direct
link to an increase in crime rates when fewer officers are staffed); Charles Fain Lehman,
America’s Shrinking Police Forces Could Spell Trouble for Our Safety, N.Y. POST (Feb. 8, 2020),
https://nypost.com/2020/02/08/americas-shrinking-police-forces-could-spell-trouble-for-oursafety/ (explaining the current—and continuing—reduction in police staffing rates will likely
result in increased crime rates and a public safety crisis).
151. See Michael C. Lens et al., Neighborhood Crime Exposure Among Housing Choice
Voucher Households, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 1 (Feb. 2011) (participants citing
crime rate as a primary motivation for moving away from a distressed neighborhood); ZHAOHUA
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own property,152 whether to open a business,153 even decisions regarding
pregnancy and child rearing.154
The evidence surveyed here suggests that some reliance interests

ZHANG & DIANE HITE, HOUSE VALUE, CRIME AND RESIDENTIAL LOCATION CHOICE, 25
(2015), (concluding participants in a housing study were more willing to pay more to move to a
location with a lower crime rate); see also AreaVibes, Know Your Neighborhood: Crime Statistics
by City, https://www.areavibes.com/library/neighborhood-crime-statistics/ (last accessed Sept. 1,
2021) (offering national crime statistic information for prospective home buyers, current
residents, or other members of the community).
152. See Martin Maximino, The Impact of Crime on Property Values: Research Roundup,
JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE (2014), https://journalistsresource.org/economics/the-impact-ofcrime-on-property-values-research-roundup/ (Recent studies, in the U.S. and abroad, found an
inverse relationship with crime reduction and property value. Several metropolitan areas in the
U.S. (Seattle, Milwaukee, Houston, Dallas, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Jacksonville)
experienced a 0.83 percent increase in property value coinciding with a 10 percent reduction in
homicide. In Latin America, increased policing between 2008-2011 “generated a 15 [percent]
increase in formal property transactions.”); Vania Ceccato & Mats Wilhelmsson, Do Crime Hot
Spots Affect Housing Prices?, 21 NORDIC J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 84, 97-99 (2020) (concluding
increased crime rates have a depressive effect on housing prices. This is especially true in major
cities in North America) (citing Thomas J. Kane, Stephanie K. Riegg, & Douglas O. Staiger,
School Quality, Neighborhoods, and Housing Prices, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 183, 183–212
(2006)).
153. Blaise R. Heid & Kathryn Heid, High-Crime Areas Aren’t Good for Business, N.Y.
TIMES (Jun. 21, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/11/opinion/l-high-crime-areas-aren-tgood-for-business-495890.html (explaining businesses are less likely to relocate or open new
location if they perceive a high crime rate could be detrimental to business); Minimizing the Risks
to Your Business Using Security Measures and Disaster Planning, WOLTERS KLUWER (Jan. 16,
2020), https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/expert-insights/minimizing-the-risks-to-your-businessusing-security-measures-and-disaster-planning (strategic site selection before opening a new
business impacts the success of a business. Moving to a high-crime area can result in more risk to
the business, and more investment for security).
154. Cf. Tom Clemens & Chris Dibben, Living in Stressful Neighborhoods During
Pregnancy: An Observational Study of Crime Rates and Birth Outcomes, 27 EUR. J. OF PUB.
HEALTH 197, 201 (2016) (study concludes that mothers in high crime areas are more likely to
have a high-risk pregnancy and an increased risk to fetal development); Elissa Nadworny, A HighCrime Neighborhood Makes it Harder to Show up For School, NPR (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/02/13/693972661/a-high-crime-neighborhood-makes-it-harder-toshow-up-for-school (a recent study from Johns Hopkins U. suggest that living in a high-crime
area, or passing through one while traveling to school, can decrease a child’s attendance. As of
2019, 1 in 7 students missed fifteen or more days of school each year); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
Facts About Children and Violence, https://www.justice.gov/archives/defendingchildhood/factsabout-children-and-violence (last accessed Sept. 1, 2021) (explaining 60 percent of children were
exposed to violence, crime, or abuse which places them at greater risk for developing substance
abuse, behavioral issues, mental health disorders, and truancy); Nancy G. Guerra, Ed.D. & Carly
Dierkhising, M.A., The Effects of Community Violence on Child Development, ACTIVE
PHYSIQUE 1, 2–5 (2011) (explaining exposure to violence or crime will negatively impact a child’s
psychological development and behavior, leading to a higher likelihood that these children will
perpetuate similar violent behaviors into adulthood); Stephanie H. Keenshaw-Price, et al.,
Neighborhood Crime-Related Safety and Its Relation to Children’s Physical Activity, 95 J. OF
URBAN HEALTH 472, 482–87 (2015) (concluding that children have a reduction in physical
activity in areas of police-reported high crime rates. This could be the result of parental perception
and safety concerns in allowing children to be active outside of the home).
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militate against overturning qualified immunity. Social science
research studying the removal of qualified immunity in places like New
York City and Colorado will further inform the extent and strength of
those interests. For now, it is safe to say that some legitimate reliance
interests may be in jeopardy if qualified immunity is overturned.155
The foregoing analysis, however, is better understood as reliance on
some form of qualified immunity, not the specific form it takes in the
“clearly established” law test. It seems clear that officers, police
departments, citizens, and state and local governments rely on qualified
immunity to some degree, but it is much less clear that they specifically
rely on the Court’s current “clearly established” law test. With regard
to police hiring, retention, and enforcement, an officer left with a
qualified immunity test that may be more legally difficult to satisfy
doesn’t seem as disruptive to reliance interests as an officer stripped of
the defense completely, even for good faith and reasonable mistakes.
More research is needed to further parse out the degree of reliance on
qualified immunity altogether, and the Court’s current “clearly
established” law standard more specifically. Early evidence suggests
there is more reliance on having some form of qualified immunity than
there is on the current test.156
5. Eliminating a Right or Defense vs. Modifying a Right or
Defense
The application of the final factor in the optimal test for stare
decisis is straightforward. Again, the factor cautions that eliminating a
right or defense deserves greater scrutiny than mere modification.
Although overruling Pierson would eliminate qualified immunity
altogether, simply overruling Harlow’s “clearly established” law
standard would represent just a modification to the defense. Thus,
under this final factor, stare decisis concerns would not affect the
modification represented by overruling Harlow, but would caution
against overruling Pierson and the complete elimination of the

155. But see Michelman, supra note 9 at 2014 (“[Q]ualified immunity generates no legitimate
reliance interests.”).
156. Moreover, reliance interests encompassed in indemnification schemes are better seen as
a product of Pierson than of Harlow’s “clearly established” law test. As charted by Professors
Nielson and Walker, “the broad indemnification schemes we have across the country today are
creatures of the 1970s.”156. Notably, this period is after the rise of qualified immunity coming
out of Pierson in 1967, yet before the Court changed to the “clearly established” law test in 1982
in Harlow. Thus, state and localities indemnification schemes are better seen as reliant on having
some form of qualified immunity, and not the specific test announced in Harlow.
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qualified immunity defense.
In practice, if the Court were to overrule Harlow, it could return to
the Pierson subjective standard or create a new test. Overruling Harlow
would not eliminate the defense of qualified immunity altogether—
officers would still be protected by the qualified immunity that existed
under Pierson and the inquiry would revert to the subjective “good
faith” standard. Thus, this factor favors overruling Harlow, but not
abolishing qualified immunity completely.
III. CONCLUSION
A closer look at procedural workability and reliance reveals a
potential path forward for the Court. There is a strong case for
eliminating the “clearly established” law test, while maintaining the
prior form of qualified immunity announced in Pierson.
The Court’s “clearly established” law test and the ambiguity
surrounding the proper level of specificity it requires, makes the test
difficult for lower courts to apply in a systematic manner. Although the
subjective test necessitated additional costs of litigation, and may have
been too generous to plaintiffs, it was not entirely unworkable, like the
Court’s current “clearly established” law standard has become. Again,
just because a justice is troubled by the results of a rule, that does not
mean the rule is procedurally unworkable.157
Although various stakeholders rely on qualified immunity to some
degree, reliance is stronger on retaining some form of qualified
immunity than on the specifics of the test. Thus, while there is reliance
on the Pierson decision recognizing the defense of qualified immunity,
the reliance argument is weaker when it comes to whether the Court
should overrule the specific formulation of the defense as announced
in Harlow.
Finally, because overruling Harlow represents a mere modification
to the qualified immunity defense, rather than a complete abolition,
stare decisis concerns have less influence.
If the Court were to follow the course advocated here and overturn
Harlow while leaving Pierson’s subjective standard intact, officers
would still be entitled to qualified immunity; however, the test would
simply revert to Pierson’s more plaintiff-friendly standard. It is
arguable whether this is an improvement, and there are likely to be

157. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT, supra note 96, at 110.
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loud voices on both sides of the aisle criticizing such a move.158
However, by an application of the factors advanced by Prof. Kozel, the
Court can make a principled decision on the difficult issue of qualified
immunity.
This Article charts a path forward for the Court to reconsider its
qualified immunity jurisprudence. Although there is a strong argument
that the Court should overrule its current “clearly established” law
standard, the case to abolish qualified immunity completely is much
more suspect. Instead, the Court should retain the defense, but
reinstitute the more plaintiff-friendly standard it established in Pierson.

158. See supra Part I(C).

